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We introduce other-regarding preferences in a credence goods model applied to
the health care market. Physicians act as experts and do not only care about
their monetary payoﬀ but also about treating their patients honestly. Patients,
on the other hand, face trust costs when they anticipate to be defrauded. We
study the impact of those other-regarding preferences on the level of fraud in
the market. Contrary to intuition, we show that the level of fraud does not
necessarily decrease in equilibrium when introducing these other-regarding
preferences but may even rise. Welfare increases with experts’ honesty but
reacts ambiguously to increased patients’ trust costs.
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This paper analyzes the impact of other-regarding preferences on the level of fraud
in a credence goods market. Medical services are a prime example of credence
goods, i.e. goods for which customers do not know which quality they need (Darby
and Karni, 1973). The patient notices that she is ill but she does not know which
disease she suﬀers from. The physician performs a diagnosis and can thereby identify
whether the patient suﬀers from a minor or a major disease. The physician might
treat his patient honestly. Due to the information asymmetry between the patient
and the physician, the physician may as well overtreat his patient, i.e. provide and
charge for a major treatment although a minor treatment would have been suﬃcient.
If the treatment is not veriﬁable to the patient, the physician might even provide
the minor treatment for the minor disease but charge for performing the major
treatment, i.e. overcharge his patient. In neither case the patient will notice that
she has been defrauded. We focus on the physician’s incentive to overcharge the
patient in this paper.
Previous work on credence goods has focused on the physicians’ and patients’ mon-
etary incentives (see e.g. Wolinsky, 1993; Emons, 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006). However, physicians do not only care about monetary incentives but also
about honesty. Dulleck et al. (2011) show in a large scale experiment that experts
like physicians base their decisions to a "considerable extent" on norms like honesty.
Even in a situation where theory would predict that experts always defraud their
customers, only half of them actually do so. In a follow-up study, Beck et al. (2011)
ﬁnd that experts feel guilty when defrauding their customers. In addition to the hon-
esty concerns experts face, physicians take the Oath of Hippocrates swearing that
they will only act for the beneﬁt of the sick (Pieper and Thurnherr, 1998). The oath
might give the physicians a reason to behave even more honestly than other experts
do.1 Patients, on the other hand, do not only care about their monetary costs of the
treatment. Tibandebage and Mackintosh (2005) show in Tanzania, where medical
expenses are completely paid out of pocket, that patients lose trust in the honesty
of their physician when they expect to be defrauded. Fehr and Gächter (2002) even
show that patients are willing to pay in order to punish the physician when they
presume to be cheated on.
1Ahlert et al. (2008) and Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2010) provide experimental evidence for
a more honest behavior of prospective physicians compared to other subject pools.
2This work introduces other-regarding preferences in a credence goods model. Physi-
cians face conscience costs in our model when they overcharge their patients. Pa-
tients face trust costs when being charged a major treatment because they anticipate
that they may have been defrauded. We study the impact of these other-regarding
preferences on the level of overcharging when patients can consult a second physi-
cian. A ﬁrst intuition would lead to the conclusion that introducing such preferences
decreases the level of overcharging in the market. We show that this intuition does
not necessarily hold in equilibrium. An increase in trust costs can lead to more
searches for a second opinion in equilibrium, making it more attractive for physi-
cians to defraud their patients.
The problem of credence goods is not limited to the health care market: the cab
ride in an unknown city (Balafoutas et al., 2011), the purchase of a highly technical
product, and a lawyer’s advice are other examples. The largest credence goods
market in most economies is the health care market though. In the US, about
2.3 trillion USD are spent per year for health care (OECD, 2009), up to 230 billion
of which are estimated to be due to fraud (Federal Bureau of Investigation (Ed.),
2007). We therefore focus on the health care market in our paper.
Related to our work is Liu (2011). She shows that two types of equilibria may exist in
a credence goods market with a possibly selﬁsh or conscientious monopolistic expert:
a uniform price equilibrium in which the selﬁsh expert free rides on the conscientious
and a nonuniform price equilibrium in which the customer can identify the type
of expert by the price list. In contrast to Liu (2011), we consider homogeneous
physicians with other-regarding preferences. We focus on the inﬂuence of these
preferences on the level of overcharging in the market rather than on the separation
of physician types.2
The remainder of the article is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the model
and other-regarding preferences. In section 3 we perform an equilibrium analysis.
Section 4 concludes and highlights implications.
2In our model, patients can search for a second opinion in order to discipline physicians. Con-
trary to Liu (2011), we assume prices to be exogenously given as most medical markets are highly
regulated. Furthermore, we do not allow for a rejection of interaction by either party. This is
because in most countries physicians are legally obliged to treat their patients. Patients, often, do
not have a choice of whether to get treated or not because diseases aggravate. While Liu (2011)’s
results are driven by this rejection of an interaction, our results are driven by the patients’ search
for a second opinion.
32 Model
The model is build upon Wolinsky (1993): There is a continuum of patients and a
large number of physicians in the health care market. Each patient either suﬀers
from a minor or a major disease. The patient notices that she is ill but does not
know from which disease she suﬀers. It is common knowledge that the patient has a
major disease with probability p or a minor disease with probability 1−p. Physicians
are able to costlessly diagnose the disease. If the patient accepts the diagnosis, the
physician treats the patient. Treating the major disease induces costs of H for the
physicians, treating the minor disease of L < H. Patients derive a utility of B when
they are treated.
Patients cannot verify the treatment. Therefore, physicians can overcharge their
patients given that they suﬀer from a minor disease. Undertreatment is ruled out
because physicians are assumed to be liable. In order to discipline physicians, pa-
tients can search for a second opinion. Searching for a physician induces costs k for
the patient. The physician does not know whether a patient is on her ﬁrst or second
visit. It is assumed that B is large enough so that getting treated makes the patient
always better oﬀ than no treatment.
In contrast to Wolinsky (1993) physicians and patients do not only follow monetary
incentives but also care about honesty and trust. Ariely and Mazar (2006) show
that experts like physicians trade-oﬀ between pursuing their own ﬁnancial goals
and being honest. They ﬁnd that people "possess internal reward mechanisms for
honesty" that "limit dishonest behavior." Physicians therefore face conscience costs
in our model when they overcharge their patient. Gneezy (2005) shows that the
non-monetary costs of defrauding increase with an increasing loss of the other party.
Consequently, we model a physician’s conscience costs by subtracting a share β of
his fraudulent proﬁt.
Patients, on the other hand, lose trust in their physician when they are confronted
with a major diagnosis. This is because they anticipate that they may have been
overcharged (Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005). We therefore add trust costs of
α weighted by the probability of being defrauded. Thus, an increase in the market
level of fraud implies higher trust costs.
We assume prices for the treatments to be exogenously given, e.g. by a regulator.
The price for the major treatment amounts to pmajor = H, the price for the minor
4treatment to pminor = L + e. e represents the mark-up on the low cost treatment
and ensures an incentive for the physician to treat his patient honestly. The reason
for assuming ﬁxed prices is that in many medical markets we can indeed observe
exogenously given prices, either because of a bargaining process on a central level
(as in the US) or by legal regulations (as e.g. in Germany) (Sülzle and Wambach,
2005).
The patient is not insured against health risks in our model. Consequently, the
treatment costs are completely borne by the patient herself. The impact of insurance
is discussed in section 2.1. Health insurance does not change any of our results as
long as the patient faces a co-payment.
The game structure is as follows:
1. Nature determines the severity of the patient’s disease: With probability p
the patient suﬀers from a major disease, with probability 1 − p from a minor
disease.
2. The patient chooses a physician and incurs search costs k.
3. The physician learns the patient’s disease. Given that the patient suﬀers from
a minor disease, the physician diagnoses a minor disease with probability 1−x
(x ∈ [0,1]) and a major disease with probability x. Given that the patient
suﬀers from a major disease, the physician diagnoses a major disease with
probability 1.
4. The patient accepts all minor diagnoses and rejects a major diagnosis with
probability 1 − y (y ∈ [0,1]).
5. If the patient accepts the diagnosis, the physician will charge accordingly.
Otherwise the patient turns to a second physician and again incurs search
costs k. She will then accept any diagnosis with certainty.
The physician’s payoﬀ is given as pi − c if the patient accepts the diagnosis, where
i ∈ {minor,major} and c ∈ {L,H}. Otherwise, the physician’s payoﬀ is 0. The
patient’s payoﬀ is given by B−pi−nk. n ∈ {1,2} indicates the number of physician
visits.
The physician’s diagnosis is a signal to the patient about her type of disease. When
receiving a diagnosis at her ﬁrst visit, the patient updates her beliefs about her type.
5When receiving a minor diagnosis, the patient beliefs with probability 1 that she
suﬀers from a minor disease. When receiving a major diagnosis, the patient beliefs
to suﬀer from a minor disease with probability
(1−p)x
p+(1−p)x. (1−p)x is the probability of
having a minor problem and being overcharged. p+(1−p)x reﬂects the probability of
receiving a major diagnosis. In the following two subsections we derive the patients’
and the physicians’ optimal strategy before turning to the (perfect bayesian) market
equilibria.
2.1 Patients’ Optimization Problem
The patient maximizes her expected utility by choosing the optimal acceptance rate
y of a major diagnosis. Suppose physicians overcharge their patients with probability
x. Then the cost function of the patient is given as:
C(y) = k + (1 − p)(1 − x)(L + e) + [p + (1 + α)(1 − p)x]yH (1)
+ [p + (1 − p)x](1 − y)

k +
(1 − p)x(1 − x)(L + e) + [p + (1 + α)(1 − p)x2]H
p + (1 − p)x

The patient incurs search costs k for her ﬁrst visit at a physician. With probability
1−p the patient suﬀers from a minor disease. With probability 1−x the physician
honestly diagnoses a minor disease. Patients accept a minor diagnosis with certainty
because they know that the physicians cannot undertreat. Patients then incur costs
of L+e. With probability p+(1−p)x the patient receives the diagnosis of a major
disease. The physician then charges H. With probability (1−p)x the patient is over-
charged, inducing trust costs of αyH. The patient accepts the major diagnosis with
probability y and searches for a second opinion with probability 1−y. Given that the
patient searches for a second opinion she incurs additional search costs k and ex-
pected costs of being treated of (1 − p)x(1 − x)(L + e) + [p + (1 + α)(1 − p)x2]H.
The patient now accepts both diagnosis with probability 1. With probability
(1 − p)x2 the patient is defrauded again and therefore again bears trust costs of
αH.
Note that the expected trust costs do not only increase with the overcharging proba-
bility x but also with a higher acceptance rate of a major diagnosis y. If the patient
never accepts a major diagnosis (y = 0), she does not face trust costs for the ﬁrst
physician. As patients always accept the second diagnosis, the patient always faces
expected trust costs of αx2H for the second visit of a physician.
6The patient trades oﬀ between accepting a major diagnosis knowing that she might
have been overcharged and costly rejecting the diagnosis. She searches for a second
opinion with probability 1 (0) if and only if the costs for a second opinion are smaller




p + (1 − p)x

(1 − x)[(1 + α)H − L − e] (2)
In the following, we assume the search costs k to be smaller than (1+α)H −L−e.
Otherwise, it is a patient’s best response to always accept a major diagnosis from
the ﬁrst physician she visits and to never search for a second opinion.
For the patient to be indiﬀerent between searching for a second opinion and accepting
the diagnosis of a major disease both terms have to be equal. Then any y ∈ [0,1]
would be a best response.
Note that equation (2) is quadratic in x. Solving for the optimal search strategy y
for a given x yields:
Lemma 1. Given a symmetric overcharging strategy by the physicians x ∈ [0,1],
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0 if x ∈ (x1,x2)
1 if x ∈ [0,x1) ∪ (x2,1]























[(1 + α)H − L − e]
(3)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results of Lemma 1 can be seen in Figure 1. Patients accept a major diagnosis
at the ﬁrst physician if the level of fraud in the market is low (i.e., x < x1). This
7is because patients anticipate that the physician most probably diagnosed honestly.
Patients also accept a major diagnosis if the level of fraud in the market is high
(x > x2) as the second physician will most probably diagnose a major disease, too.
If x1 < x < x2 holds, the patient will search for a second opinion.
We now analyze how a change in trust costs changes the search behavior of patients.
Proposition 1. An increase in the patients’ trust costs ceteris paribus increases the
probability of rejecting a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst physician.







α ↑ α ↑
Figure 1: Patients’ Best Response Correspondence After Increase in Trust Costs
The result of Proposition 1 is displayed in Figure 1. An increase in the patients’
trust costs results in an increase in their expected costs of being defrauded. Thus,
searching for a second opinion becomes more attractive for patients. In consequence,
the probability of rejecting a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst physician increases.
Note that an increase in the patients’ trust costs has the same eﬀect as if the pa-
tients were insured and co-payments were increased (Sülzle and Wambach, 2005).
Increasing co-payments makes the patients bear a larger share of their treatment
costs. This implies that patients also pay a larger share of the fraudulent costs.
Thus, the probability of searching for a second opinion increases.
82.2 Physicians’ Optimization Problem
Physician i maximizes his proﬁt Πi by choosing the optimal level of overcharging
xi. Due to the given price structure the physician can only make positive proﬁts
with patients suﬀering from a minor disease. Suppose that patients accept a major
diagnosis with probability y, and all other physicians overcharge the patient with




Πi = (1 − xi)e + (1 − β)xi

y + x(1 − y)
1 + x(1 − y)

(H − L) (4)
With probability 1−xi, the physician diagnoses patients with a minor disease hon-
estly. An honest diagnosis ensures the physician the certain proﬁt e. With prob-
ability xi, the physician overcharges his patients suﬀering from a minor disease.
1
1+x(1−y) of the patients are on their ﬁrst visit and accept the major diagnosis with
probability y.
x(1−y)
1+x(1−y) patients were diagnosed a major disease at another physician,






(H −L) that is being subtracted reﬂects the conscience costs the
physician faces when defrauding his patients.
The physician trades oﬀ between overcharging patients with a minor disease and
treating them honestly. While defrauding yields a higher monetary proﬁt H − L > e
it includes the risk that patients might consult another physician. Thus, the physi-
cian’s best response is to overcharge any patient suﬀering from a minor disease with
probability 1 (0), if
e < (>)(1 − β)

y + x(1 − y)
1 + x(1 − y)

(H − L) (5)
The physician is indiﬀerent between both actions if the mark-up on treating the
minor disease equals the expected proﬁt of defrauding. The individual physician’s
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Concentrating on symmetric responses, it has to hold that the physician’s individual
defrauding strategy xi corresponds to the other physician’s defrauding strategy x.
The optimal symmetric defrauding strategy depending on the level of conscience
costs is given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Given the patients’ acceptance strategy y, the physicians’ symmetric best






   
   

0,
e − y(1 − β)(H − L)







(1 − β)(H − L)

{1} if y ∈

e
(1 − β)(H − L)
,1

For medium conscience costs, i.e. 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L ≤ β ≤ 1 − e
H−L, the physicians’
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
For large conscience costs, i.e. β > 1− e




Proof. See Appendix C.
Obviously, for large conscience costs the physicians’ best response it to always diag-
nose honestly. For small and medium conscience costs, the physicians’ best response
is a joint best response to the patients’ and the other physicians’ behavior. Given
10that patients accept a major diagnosis suﬃciently often (i.e., y is large), it is a
physician’s best response to always defraud patients with a minor disease (x = 1).
Given that patients rarely accept a major diagnosis, the physician’s best response
depends on the other physicians’ strategy: If the other physicians defraud (x = 1),
it is the physician’s best response to also defraud his patients. This is because he
knows that many of his patients are searching for a second opinion and therefore
accept any diagnosis with certainty. If the other physicians behave honestly (x = 0),
it is the physician’s best response to also behave honestly. This is because many
patients are on their ﬁrst visit and would search for a second opinion if receiving
a major diagnosis. For small conscience costs β < 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L , there also exists a
region (the dashed line in Figure 2) for which physicians are indiﬀerent between
overcharging and charging honestly.






. From the physician’s individual best response we
see that after an increase in conscience costs from β0 to β1 ≤ 1 − e
H−L, it is the







. If β1 > 1− e
H−L, it is the physician’s best response
to now always treat the patient honestly.
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the physicians’ conscience costs
decreases their incentive to overcharge.
Proof. Follows immediately from the physician’s individual best response.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2.
3 Equilibria
The market equilibria are obtained by joining the patients’ and the physicians’ best
response. In order to discriminate the eﬀects of introducing patients’ trust costs and
physicians’ conscience costs, we ﬁrst consider the benchmark case where patients and











Figure 2: Physicians’ Best Response Correspondence after Increase in Conscience Costs
(for the case of small conscience costs)
3.1 Equilibria without Other-Regarding Preferences
In a market without other-regarding preferences, Sülzle and Wambach (2005) show
that the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 3. For 0 < 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L and suﬃciently small k, there exist three equilibria:
In the two mixed strategy equilibria physicians sometimes defraud patients facing
a minor disease. Patients sometimes search for a second opinion if they receive a
major diagnosis. In the pure strategy equilibrium, physicians always defraud and
patients never search for a second opinion.
If 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L ≤ 0 ≤ 1 − e
H−L, there only exists an equilibrium in pure strategies in
which physicians always defraud and patients never search for a second opinion.
If 0 > 1− e
H−L, there exists only an equilibrium in pure strategies in which physicians
never defraud and patients never search for a second opinion.
Proof. See Sülzle and Wambach (2005).
The interesting case is when 0 < 1− e
H−L, i.e. the mark-up for a minor treatment is
smaller than the diﬀerence in costs between major and minor treatment. Then the
intuition for the equilibria is as follows: In the equilibrium of pure strategies (A),
patients always accept the diagnosis of a major disease (see Figure 3). Therefore,
it is the physician’s best response to always defraud his patients suﬀering from a
minor disease. Anticipating the physicians’ behavior, it is a patient’s best response
12to always accept the diagnosis of a major disease because any other physician would
defraud the patient, too. In equilibrium B and C, the patients are indiﬀerent be-
tween accepting a major diagnosis and costly searching for another opinion while
the physicians are indiﬀerent between diagnosing honestly and defrauding a patient
with a minor disease. If 0 > 1 − e
H−L it never pays for a physician to defraud a









Figure 3: Equilibria without Other-Regarding Preferences
3.2 Equilibria with Patients’ Trust Costs
Now let us turn to the case where patients lose trust in their physician by a possible
overcharging while physicians only care about their monetary proﬁt, i.e. α > 0 and
β = 0. A ﬁrst intuition would lead to the conclusion that an increase of patients’
trust costs increases the probability of searching for a second opinion and therefore
decreases the physicians’ incentive to overcharge. This intuition only partly holds
in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. An increase in the patients’ trust costs leads to the following changes
in the three possible equilibria:
1. At equilibrium B0, there is less fraud in the market than in B. Patients search
less often for a second opinion than in B.
2. At equilibrium C0, there is more fraud in the market than in C. Patients search
more often for a second opinion than in C.
3. At equilibrium A, there are no changes.
13Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 4. Starting from equilibrium, an increase
in the probability of searching for a second opinion makes the physician strictly
better oﬀ if he diagnoses honestly. If a physician is honest, it is the patient’s best
response to stay at the ﬁrst physician she visits. In the emerging equilibria, the
two eﬀects have to be balanced. Starting from equilibrium B, overcharging in fact
decreases and patients search less often for a second opinion than in B. Starting
from equilibrium C, the eﬀects are reverse: As more patients search for a second
opinion, the physicians anticipate that more patients accept the (second) diagnosis
with certainty. Therefore, the physicians’ incentive to overcharge increases. Note
that both eﬀects – the change in the acceptance rate and the change in the level of
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Figure 4: Change in Equilibria after Increase in Patients’ Trust Costs
An increase in the patients’ trust costs does not only inﬂuence the level of overcharg-
ing. Through the change in the number of searches for a second opinion, welfare
is also aﬀected since each visit at a physician induces search costs of k. Welfare
is maximized if patients visit only one physician. Starting from equilibrium B, an
increase in trust costs decreases the number of second physician visits. Welfare is
therefore increased. Again, the opposite holds starting from equilibrium C. Note
that overcharging is a pure redistribution between patients and physicians and does
therefore not impact welfare.
143.3 Equilibria with Physicians’ Conscience Costs
In a situation where physicians face conscience costs while patients do not account
for trust costs, i.e. α = 0 and β > 0, the following holds:
Proposition 4. An increase in the physicians’ conscience costs does not change the
level of fraud in the market as long as conscience costs do not change from small to
medium/large or from medium to large. If conscience costs are small, an increase
in conscience costs leads to less searches for a second opinion.
Proof. See Appendix E.
If conscience costs are small, an increase in conscience costs does not lead to less
overcharging but to a lower search frequency in equilibrium. Fewer searches increase
welfare as each search causes costs of k. Equilibrium A does not change. As a












Figure 5: Change in Equilibria After Increase in Physicians’ Conscience Costs
(for the case of small conscience costs)
The above analysis assumes that the increase in conscience costs does not result in
a change from small to medium/large or medium to large conscience costs. Relaxing
this assumption leads to a discontinuity in the physicians’ best response at the inter-
val boundaries: An increase from small to medium conscience costs then increases
the level of fraud in the market if the equilibrium was in mixed strategies (B or C).
This is because the two mixed strategy equilibria do not exist when conscience costs
are medium. Instead, the only market equilibrium is the pure strategy equilibrium
in which physicians always defraud and patients always search for a second opinion.
15An increase from small/medium to large conscience costs changes the physicians’
behavior to a purely honest behavior because the conscience costs then exceed the
fraudulent proﬁt.
3.4 Equilibria with Patients’ Trust Costs and Physicians’
Conscience Costs
Accounting for both, patients’ trust costs and physicians’ conscience costs, i.e. α > 0
and β > 0, leads to the following results:
Proposition 5. Increasing patients’ trust costs and physicians’ conscience costs
leads to the following changes in the three possible equilibria if conscience costs are
small:
1. At equilibrium B000, the level of fraud in the market decreases compared to
equilibrium B while patients search less often for a second opinion.
2. At equilibrium C000, the level of fraud rises compared to equilibrium C. Whether
patients search for a second opinion more or less often depends on the cost
ratio: If the ratio of trust to conscience costs is high, we observe less searches
in C000 than in C while if the ratio is low, we observe more.
3. Equilibrium A remains unchanged.
If conscience costs are medium, physicians always overcharge their patients in equi-
librium and patients never search for a second opinion. If conscience costs are large,
physicians always diagnose honestly and patients never search for a second opinion.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 6. Starting from equilibrium B, an increase
in the patients trust costs and the physicians’ conscience costs leads to fewer searches
and therefore to an increase in social welfare. Starting from equilibrium C, increasing
the impact of the other-regarding preferences increases welfare if the ratio of trust





















Figure 6: Equilibria after Increase in Trust and Conscience Costs Given a High (Low)
Cost Ratio on the Left (Right)
4 Conclusion and Implications
We analyze the impact of an increase in other-regarding preferences on the physi-
cians’ level of fraud. In contrast to intuition, we ﬁnd that an increase in conscience
costs and trust costs does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud in the market,
nor does it necessarily decrease the level of second opinions.
Increasing patients’ trust costs ceteris paribus increases the probability of a search
for a second opinion. Starting from equilibrium, increasing the trust costs reduces
the level of fraud in the market if the level was low before, but increases the level of
fraud if the level was high. The increase in fraud is due to the fact that an increase
in trust costs can lead to more searches for a second opinion in equilibrium, making
it more attractive for physicians to defraud their patients. Increasing physicians’
conscience costs ceteris paribus decreases their incentive to overcharge. Starting
from equilibrium, the introduction of conscience costs does not change the level of
fraud because the higher incentive to diagnose honestly is set oﬀ by less searches for
a second opinion by the patients.
The implications of the model are twofold: Sensitizing patients for overcharging
lowers the level of fraud if the market currently experiences a low level of fraud
but it increases fraud if the level of fraud is already high. A more morally focused
education of the physicians will always decrease the number of searches for a second
opinion and therefore increase welfare.
17Welfare depends on the number of searches for second opinions and on the ratio
of trust to conscience costs. An increase in the patients’ trust costs increases (de-
creases) welfare if the equilibrium is characterized by a low (high) level of fraud.
An increase in the physicians’ conscience costs always increases welfare. Increasing
both costs leads to a higher welfare in case of the low fraud equilibrium. In case of
the high fraud equilibrium, welfare increases if the ratio of trust to conscience costs
is high.
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20Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose x ∈ [0,1]. Rearranging inequality 2 (with an equal sign) and substituting
with c = k
(1+α)H−L−e < 1 yields:
x





c = 0 (6)







c > 0 (7)
From equation 6 it follows that for x < x1 and x > x2 the patient will strictly
prefer to accept a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst physician, i.e. to choose y = 1.
If x1 < x < x2, it is a patients best response to reject the major diagnosis and to
search for a second opinion, i.e. to choose y = 0.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Taking the partial derivative of x with respect to α in equation (2) yields:
k =
(1 − p)x(α)
p + (1 − p)x(α)









(p + (1 − p)x(α))2
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(1 − 2x)[(1 + α)H − L − e] − k
(8)The numerator is always positive, the denominator is positive if x < xc and negative






. Given the solutions from Lemma (1), it
holds that dx
dα > 0 for x2 and dx
dα < 0 for x1.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Note that if β > 1− e
H−L it is obviously the physicians’ best response to always charge
honestly because the conscience costs exceed the fraudulent proﬁt. We therefore
assume β < 1 − e
H−L in the following.
Depending on the patients’ symmetric strategy y ∈ [0,1], we distinguish three situ-
ations following Sülzle and Wambach (2005):
1. Patients always accept a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst physician (y = 1):











(1 − β)(H − L) (9)
It is physician i’s best response to always overcharge his patient (xi = 1)
because the fraudulent proﬁt (1−β)(H −L) exceeds the proﬁt from an honest
diagnosis e.
2. Patients always reject a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst physician (y = 0):
















(H − L) (10)
The physician’s best response depends on the other physicians’ behavior. We
distinguish three cases:
• If all other physicians diagnose honestly, i.e. x = 0, equation (10) reduces
to e > 0. Consequently, it is physician i’s best response to also diagnose
honestly xi = 0. This is because y = 0 implies that every patient with
a minor disease is on his ﬁrst visit. If physician i diagnosed a majortreatment, the patient would reject the diagnosis with certainty and the
physician would make zero proﬁts.
• If all other physicians defraud their patients (x = 1), it is physician i’s
best response to also defraud his patient given that β ≤ 1 − 2e
H−L. Physi-
cian i anticipates that there are suﬃciently many patients with a minor
disease that are on their second visit. They accept a major diagnosis
with certainty. If β ≥ 1 − 2e
H−L, x = 1 is not a symmetric best response
because the deviation strategy xi = 0 would yield higher proﬁts than
xi = 1.
• If all other physicians randomize their behavior (x ∈ (0,1)), a best sym-
metric response requires physician i to be indiﬀerent between an honest
and a fraudulent diagnosis for a patient with a minor disease. From rear-
ranging inequality (5) with an equal sign with regard to x we know that
indiﬀerence holds if and only if
x =
e
(1 − β)(H − L) − e
(11)
A symmetric best response exists if and only if β < 1 − 2e
H−L. If
β > 1 − 2e
H−L, an individual physician would again have the incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
3. Patients do not always but sometimes accept a major diagnosis from the ﬁrst
physician (y ∈ (0,1)). Rearranging inequality (5) (with an equal sign) yields:
(1 − β)y(H − L) + (1 − β)x(1 − y)(H − L − e) − e = 0 (12)




(H − L) − x(H − L − e)
(1 − y)(H − L − e)
< 0 (13)
An increase in y leads to a decrease in x. This is because physicians need
less patients with a minor disease to be indiﬀerent between defrauding and
diagnosing honestly. We again distinguish three cases:
• If the other physicians diagnose honestly (x = 0), equation (12) is fulﬁlled
if and only if
y =
e
(1 − β)(H − L)
(14)Consequently, it is a physician’s best response to diagnose honestly








• If the other physicians always defraud (x = 1), it is a physician’s best
response to also defraud (xi = 1) if and only if
(1 − β)y(H − L) + (1 − β)x(1 − y)(H − L − e) − e > 0 (15)
This is given if β < 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L .
• If the physicians sometimes but not always defraud their patients
(x ∈ (0,1)), the individual physician i is indiﬀerent between defrauding
and diagnosing honestly if and only if
x =
e − y(1 − β)(H − L)
(1 − y[(1 − β)(H − L) − e])
(16)
x ∈ (0,1) if and only if β < 1 −
e(2−y)
H−L . According to equation (13) x
decreases in y and reaches the value 0 for y = e
(1−β)(H−L).
D Proof of Proposition 3
As shown in Proposition 1, an increase in the patients’ trust costs leads to a change
in the patients’ best response correspondence. There is no direct inﬂuence on the
physicians’ best response but an indirect inﬂuence through the change in the pa-
tients’ behavior. The change can be obtained by taking the total diﬀerential of




x(1 − x)(1 − y)H(H − L − e)
[(1 − 2x)[(1 + α)H − L − e] − k][x(H − L − e) − (H − L)]
(17)
The numerator is always positive. The sign of the denominator depends on x. Note
that we obtain the same critical value xc as in Proposition 1. For x < xc it holds
that the denominator is negative so that
dy
dα > 0 while for x > xc the denominator
is positive so that
dy
dα < 0.E Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that the increase in conscience costs is marginal in the sense that the in-
crease does not switch the costs from small to medium/large or medium to large.
Then if the conscience costs are small, the emerging equilibria B00 and C00 always ex-
ist. This is because d
dβ
e
(1−β)(H−L)−e > 0, i.e. the intersection of the physicians’ best
response and the abscissa is shifted to the right. This in turn ensures the existence
of two intersections between the physicians’ and the patients’ best response.
As seen in Proposition 2, an increase in the physicians’ conscience costs ceteris
paribus decreases the physicians’ level of overcharging. However, the optimal level



























Note that in the pure strategy equilibrium A, the level of overcharging does not
change with increasing conscience costs, either.
The increase in conscience costs does not have a direct inﬂuence on the patients’ best
response. But there is an indirect inﬂuence that increases the patients’ acceptance
rate y in equilibria B00 and C00. The indirect eﬀect is obtained by taking the total
diﬀerential of inequality 5 (with an equal sign):
dx = −
1
(1 − y)2dy +
e(H − L)





(1 − y)2(H − L)e
[(1 − β)(H − L) − e]2 > 0 (18)
For medium and large conscience costs the respective equilibrium in pure strategies
still exists.F Proof of Proposition 5
Changes in the physicians’ behavior follow immediately from Proposition 3 and 4.
Suppose the physicians’ conscience costs are small. Then the change in the patients




> 0 for x < xc
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[(1 − 2x)[(1 + α)H − L − e] − k][x(H − L − e) − (H − L)]
dα
+
(1 − y)2(H − L)e
[(1 − β)(H − L) − e]2dβ (19)










dβ are positive. An increase in both costs
therefore increases the patients acceptance rate starting from equilibrium B. For
x > xc,
dy
dα is negative while
dy
dβ remains positive. The overall eﬀect starting from
equilibrium C therefore depends on the cost ratio: Assume α increases for a ﬁxed β.
Then the denominator of
dy
dα increases, the absolute value of the fraction decreases.
We can therefore conclude, that if the ratio of trust to conscience costs is high, an
increase in trust and conscience costs increases the patients’ acceptance rate (i.e.
the number of searches for a second opinion decreases). If the ratio is low, the
acceptance rate decreases with increasing costs.
If physicians’ conscience costs are medium or large, an increase in the other-
regarding preferences does not change the players behavior (see Lemma 2).